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THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS OF
WATER DEMAND MANAGEMENT: ALL
DRESSED UP AND NOWHERE TO GO
John E. Keith

ABSTRACT

Economists have advocated efficient use of water resources through the demand
management tool of marginal cost (including opportunity cost) pricing policies for several
decades, using increasingly sophisticated models to point out the welfare gains of this policies.
More recently, water markets have become de rigueur in many articles, books and texts as a way
to "automatically" include both delivery and opportunity costs.
A review of the experience in both the developed and developing world, however,
suggests that the adoption of these policies has been infrequent at best, particularly for irrigated
agriculture. The objective of this paper is to review existing demand management activities in
many countries, including the U.S., and to try to provide some understanding of the failure of
water management agencies to employ these tools.
Water subsidies for agricultural water are found in many developed countries, such as the
United States, and widely among developing countries, even when water is in critically short
supply. Most papers and reports describing the application of marginal cost pricing and/or water
markets, the same few references appear over and over (Chile, Israel, and Australia, for
example). Many authors suggest that the reason for the widespread absence of full marginal cost
pricing and/or water markets lies in the rent seeking behavior of current beneficiaries and the
inertia in water management systems.
While these barriers are important, technical and institutional difficulties also playa
critical role, especially in irrigated agriculture. Based on examples from many countries, it is
clear that water measurement at the user level does not exist and that it will be costly to
implement and maintain, reducing the ability of managers to apply efficient pricing. Moreover,
creating water (use) rights also requires some form of water control and measurement at the user
level. For systems with many very small farmers, the problem is multiplied substantially.
Institutional barriers also are difficult to overcome. Some of these barriers, such as reluctant
administrations and powerful lobbies, reflect, at least in part, the kind of rent-seeking and inertia
economists (and others) often point out. Some involve the economic reality of long-term
leasehold interest and consequent large losses of investment value. Some are related to
institutions other than those for water, such as insecure and/or fragmented land tenure. Still
others are cultural and social, and represent a broad consensus of society, rather than specific
beneficiary groups. The many examples of the institutional and technical difficulties suggest that
as demand management increasingly becomes the rhetoric of water economists, and the water
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management community in general, finding workable solutions to the those problems is
absolutely essential if efficient water pricing and water markets are to be implemented.

Introduction
Many economic researchers and practitioners have written on the subject of optimal
water allocations and water pricing. The criteria for economic efficiency are clear: supply
equals demand or marginal costs equal marginal benefits equal price. Of course, various
constraints can affect these conditions - for example, the existence of externalities, common
property and public good characteristics, and economies of scope and scale. Still, there are
volumes of scholarly books and articles which deal with these problems and basically reach the
same conclusion. As a highly respected, University of Chicago-trained professor of mine once
put it: economic efficiency (and therefore public welfare maximization) is achieved by equating
at the margin in all directions.
The current literature in water economics focuses mainly on three issues: water markets,
water pricing, and pollution. The latter topic is extremely critical without doubt. However, this
paper will focus on quantity aspects of water allocation and only briefly touch on quality
problems. The title of this paper suggests the following: Economists and economic analyses
have proven themselves capable of identifying the benefits to individuals and societies which
arise from the establishment of water markets and, in the absence of full markets, have estimated
the appropriate tariffs on water which would achieve economics efficiency. Unfortunately, the
long history of economic analysis is not accompanied by a similarly long history of the
development of water markets or the application of optimal, economically efficient tariffs. This
paper attempts to suggest reasons why the failure to implement these economic tools of demand
management seems so ubiquitous. The author does not claim originality. Most of the
observations have been made elsewhere. Yet, it seems that in a conference on Water Demand
Management, attention should be focused to some degree on the obstacles to these effective
economic policies.
For the most part, water demand management (quantity) issues focus on irrigation for
several reasons. First, irrigation reflects an insufficient quantity of rainfall to produce viable
crops, so that agricultural production depends on some kind of development activity. Second,
once in place, irrigation usually consumes at least a majority - and most often a great majorityof the developed water. Third, agriculture is generally speaking the least valuable use of water;
that is to say, the net value of crops is usually small relative to other uses (municipal, industrial)
per unit of water consumed. Finally, agriculture is usually granted significant water subsidies in
the form of little or no charges for water compared to other users. Thus, economic analyses of
efficient water use and demand management usually target shifts of water use from low valued
agriculture to higher valued uses.
Water Markets
Much of the "new water demand management economics" is focused on the development
of water markets, for clear theoretical reasons, as Hutchins, R. L. Anderson, Gardner and
Fullerton, and Charles W. Howe, et al. all pointed out early literature (1930-1970) on potential
water markets in the West. Individuals and firms trading water based on its value and cost
should reach a solution in which economic efficiency is achieved. No one will pay more than the
value of additional water to him or her; no one will sell additional water for less than it costs him
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or her. Water will be transferred at the margin from low valued uses to high valued uses
automatically. Water sources will only be developed if the benefits of the additional water are
greater than or equal to the costs of provision. Finally, any water transfer is accompanied by a
"fair" compensation for the loss of the right to the seller - a "win-win" situation.
Many authors (Gardner and Fullerton; Anderson and Snyder; Wahl, 1986 and 1989;
Easter and Hearne; to name just a few) have discussed the value of market transfers in allocating
water resources, the economic costs inherent in the failure to allocate efficiently, and the
impediments to free transfers. In much of the water market literature, the same examples appear:
the American West, Chile, Spain, and East Asia (India and Bangladesh). The examples from the
Western United States are relatively numerous. Some are based on transfers from low value to
high value agricultural water users within a canal company (water user association) or other
institutional entity. Some are based on exchanges between irrigators (usually represented by
canal companies) and municipal or industrial users. Others involve sales of water to various
types of users within a water management agency (such as the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District). Still others represent water leasing arrangements in times of drought. In
Chile, water sales from users and user organizations to municipal users are noted. Even though
these examples demonstrate gains from trade and markets in water rights, the markets are often
confined to relatively small areas and trading is limited.
Since markets seem so attractive as an allocation mechanism, why are there only a few
examples of working water markets evidenced around the world? Failure to implement markets
has most often been laid at the feet of rent seeking users and government administrators (see, for
example, Anderson and Snyder). But is that a sufficient critique of how few water markets have
developed or encouraged?
As many authors (including Reidinger, Schleyer, Cummings and Nercesiantz, Simpson
and Berkoff - all found in Le Moigne, et al) point out, markets require several specific
conditions to be effective. First, some form of water right must be allocated to individuals and/or
organizations. Those "rights" must include the three attributes generally recognized in the
economic literature: the right to use, the right to transfer, and the ability to exclude others. As a
part of this institutional framework, recourse to recognized and consistent authority must be
provided such that these rights may be defended. In addition, quantification and measurement
are a necessary condition for rights to be assigned or transferred. Finally, for market to be
efficient, consideration of external effects must be considered.
In almost all nations, water is regarded as a property of the State and the "right" to the

water resource belongs to the government. Within the examples of water markets which have
been presented in the literature, the form of the water right varies substantially, but in almost all
cases, it is a "usufructory" right - that is, a "right" is granted to use a certain allocation of water,
subject to a set of conditions (among which is the recognition of the State's ownership of water).
These rights may be "appropriative" (such as found in the Western United States), where the
amount and priority for diversion are granted by the State government (not the Federal
government). One comment often heard is that most of the surface water in the Western US is
"over-appropriated" - that is, the amount of water rights granted exceeds the average water
production for the specified area. The priority serves to allocate water. During scarcity, higher
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priority rights are able to divert water whereas lower priority rights are not. During periods of
high water production, the lower priority rights can gain access. As a result, markets in water
rights discount low priorities, as should be the case. In Chile, the allocated rights are
distinguished in priority by general characteristics (classes). However, the government retains
the right to withdraw or reallocate water rights in times of water scarcity. In other cases, water
"rights" are stated in the form of delivery contracts or agreements (the water companies in the
Western United States are an example). The certainty of the right (contract) depends upon the
contract conditions, and transfers of water rights or contracts may be constrained by those
conditions. A good discussion of this approach in the Western US can be found in Wahl (1989).
In Morocco, the newly created River Basin Agencies are charged with providing authorizations
for the use of surface and ground water. These authorizations, however, are granted for 5 to 20
years (renewable), and not freely transferable, so water markets would be only for temporary
transfers, at best. Many countries follow similar patterns.
In many developing countries, water "rights" are regarded with at best suspicion. Many,

if not most, countries view water provision and allocation as a state function. The "right" to use
water is seldom granted, although most water managers (in Egypt, for example) see provision of
water supply as a duty and failure to deliver the full measure of water as a potential disaster to be
avoided if possible. In more developed countries, private or semi-private firms or agencies are
granted a water right and a franchise to sell water to consumers. The Northern Colorado
Conservancy District (NCCD) and the Societe du Canal de Provence in Southern France (SCP)
are examples. However, this type of allocation mechanism frequently creates a monopoly
supplier and the government often sets limits on the "market" price which can be charged. These
suppliers contract with buyers based on their offer price. These are clearly markets, but not the
competitive markets of open trading among individual owners of water rights. It should be
noted, however, that other existing sources of water may also limit pricing to close to
competitive levels (see Spulber, for example, for a discussion of monopoly pricing with threats
of entry). Clearly, so long as monopoly prices are not charged, there is a gain from the trade in
water rights. In the SCP case, a range of purchase options, which include interruptability and
priority delivery, are given to buyers. It should be noted that, at the current prices (ranging from
about $0.30 to $0.50 per cubic meter) only about 40% of the available SCP agricultural water is
sold (Keith). Note that "franchising" water distribution to private firms is being considered in
many areas, such as in the Souss Massa basin in Morocco, where water from storage is being
contracted to a firm for delivery to areas of groundwater exhaustion (Keith and Ouattar). A large
portion of these "franchises" are found in municipal water supply.
The measurement of water allocations is also often impediments to broad water markets,
especially in developing countries with many small farmers. Without a measure of the "right"
and a measure of the amount of the sale, markets are not likely to flourish. For small systems
with a large number of withdrawal points, measurements are very costly. There are cases of
market-like exchanges in these systems, such as in Egypt's Fayoum region, in which water
"turns" are exchanged although even there, there is little evidence of monetary transactions
(Cardinelli, et al.). In most cases in which markets exist in these kinds of small farm systems,
either the market is informal or the buying or selling agency is a water user association, rather
than individuals. The WUA acts more or less as an agent of water users in negotiating water
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transfers outside of the internal exchanges which might occur. Again, most of these "markets"
exist within a small region or project.
The protection of third parties in market structures - at least with respect to quantity - is
a function of the right itself. Some rights are granted with respect to consumptive use, some with
respect to withdrawals or diversions. Since the latter normally involve return flows to surface or
ground water, trades in rights must secure access to other rights holders. In either case,
knowledge about the return flows is necessary before the water right can be firmly established,
which requires measurement and studies. In many cases, this knowledge is lacking. There is a
significant literature in the U.S. arguing that water markets do not protect third parties and may
diminish, rather than improve, social welfare (Brown and Ingram and Mumme and Ingram, for
example). Moreover, social values in many countries, including but not limited to Muslim
countries, seem opposed to the granting of water rights. It is true that this "social" position is
often espoused by the government water managers (perhaps fearful of losing control of a
valuable political resource, which would certainly be rent-seeking), but my experience over 30
years of water research and policy analysis, anecdotal though it is, suggests that the mistrust of
granting water rights is relatively widespread, probably due at least in part to non-transparency
of government actions in water management and other arenas. Note, for example, that even
where water markets seem relatively abundant in several Western US states, those states have
denied water right owners the ability to trade or transfer out of the state boundaries in fear of
losing some future potential economic development within the state.
Clearly, water markets do represent an alternative allocation method which can achieve
economic efficiency. But most developing countries must be willing to change the way in which
they view and manage water "ownership" before markets can immerge. Some options - such as
tradable delivery contracts - may offer a way around mistrust of full water use rights, but limited
rights also mean limited gains in efficient. In any event, without the institutional structures technical (measurement) and legal (rights) - it is highly doubtful that water markets will assume
a major role in water allocation, and that these markets will continue to be locally confined and
relatively undeveloped. To repeat, water markets are the exception in the world, rather than the
rule. Thus, I tum to the pricing of water by government, quasi-government, or private utilities.

Water Pricing
If the economic literature on water markets is large, the literature on optimal water
pricing is enormous. Pricing at marginal cost - including opportunity cost - has been examined
in many countries. The literature for the Western U.S. case spans many decades. Critiques of
water pricing and subsidies in U.S. federal projects can be found in almost any academic journal
related to natural resource management. Operations research models of optimal water
allocations (and the optimal shadow prices of water) abound and a list of references from highly
respected researchers is very long indeed, including such names as Charles W. Howe, B.
Delworth Gardner, Robert A. Young, and Oscar R. Burt in the 1960s and 1970s up to Ariel
Dinar, Yakov Tsur, David Zilberman in the last two decades,just to name a few. The record in
optimal pricing - particularly for agriculture - is dismal.
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"The Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms," edited by Ariel Dinar (Dinar, ed.)
reports work from many authors relative to the theory and practice of the implementation of
optimal water pricing. In his first chapter, he presents his and others (Ahmed and various
publications of the OECD in 1998 and 1999) examinations of water pricing throughout the world
(Table 1). There seem to me to be two striking features of these comparisons: First, there are
relatively few countries charging a volumetric delivery fee to agriculture which might be
expected to approximate cost recovery. Those countries are, by and large, Northern European,
with the addition of Israel and Tanzania. Their prices are generally between 0.10 and 0.50 per
cubic meter. 1 The remainder (including the United States) appear likely to be below-cost
charges (or no charges, which is the case in most North African and Middle Eastern countries),
and range from $0.001 to $0.04 per cubic meter. The second observation, also in general, is that
water tariffs for municipal and industrial users are significantly (orders of magnitude) higher
than irrigation charges. Of course, delivered potable water would be expected to be more costly
than irrigation water. However, there is also agreement that potable water charges, particularly
in developing countries, also are below cost.
Dinar's book is an essential reference for anyone interested in the problems of
implementing optimal water prices. While I don't wish to review the presentations (and they are
better off read in the original) there seems to me to be a general agreement that water pricing
reform is a complex issue, involving political and institutional, as well as technical, aspects. The
impetus for reform appears to come from either a crisis (or near crisis) in the form of drought,
growing demand far exceeding supply, physical and/or financial failure of the delivery system,
or from outside forces (such as the World Bank or other donors). It should be noted that several
pricing structures are discussed in this book, and none appear to be completely transparent. The
success of reform depends on many factors, among which Dinar lists institutional constraints,
political constraints and the development of support or opposition, and redistribution of wealth.
These are, of course, inter-linked. Again, according to Dinar, successful reform requires careful
Country
Fixed
cost
(ha or
season

Algeria
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Botswana
Brazil
Canada

1

3.797.59
0.752.27

3.5
6.6236.7

Agriculture
Variable
Fixed cost
cost (cubic (household
meter)
per yr or
month)

.019-.022
0.0195
.36-.98

.004-.032
.0017.0019

9-162

Domestic
Variable
cost
(cubic
meter)

Fixed
cost
(plant
per year
or
month)

Industrial
Variable
Cost
(cubic
meter)

0.57-.27

4.64

.23-.54
0.85
2.06-2.47
.28-1.48
0.4

7.82

.34-1.36

.17-1.52

The reported cost for irrigation water in Turkey is $12.00 to $80.00 per cubic meter, which seems improbable.
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Czech Republic
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
92-210
Hungary
India
0.1627.5
Israel
21 Italy
78.2
Japan
246
Jordan
Korea
Lebanon
Luxembourg
Madagascar 6.2511.3
Mexico
33-60
Namibia
53
Netherlands
New
6.8Zealand
16.6
1.5-5.8
Pakistan
Portugal

0.68
3.18
.07-.09
2.76
.36-2.58
2.69
1.14
0.82

0.71

.11-.39
.02-.08

0.82
.16-.26

Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tanzania
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
UK

.136-.29
0.26

.12-.35

1.01
.075-.25

.32-1.75
.08-.35

.004-.028

1.54-4.28

.22-1.38
3.16

.57-1.71

16 - 164
.25-1.63

.31-.69
.06-.10

.38-.97

4.46-1937

.15-.53
.04-1.07
.0004.005

.0001-.028
1.67-3.33
.33-1.96
3.21

50
23-214
.26-.40
.02-.08
12.-80.

152-171
US
Yemen

5.49

8.71

Saudi Arabia
Spain
1.0-165
4.711.2

.36-2.16
1.02-3.70

.14-.82
1.56
.27-1.03
0.27

.01-.04

.009-.019

Sudan

.0095-.08
0.36

.12-.59

.01-.04
.02-1.45

.08-.10
1.29
.11-.53
.25-.42
.06-.24
.096-.53

8.862705

1.19
.0004.005

1.673.33

.08-.10
0.71
.26-.40
0.58

.38-.59
.0095.025

.72-1.35

.10-13.79

.10-13.7

Table 1. Water prices by selected countries (taken from Dinar)
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planning, the existence of some institutional framework, a cadre of political support sufficient to
achieve the reform, and most likely patience.
My own anecdotal evidence (as well as evidence from many other authors) suggests
some additional cautions. First, where delivery systems are deteriorated due to failure of
maintenance, it is highly unlikely that farmers will be willing to pay for water deliveries. In
most of these cases, deliveries are uncertain at best, or completely absent. Setting a tariff equal
to cost recovery is not likely to bring participation. A clear example is that of the Aral Sea
Basin. Farmers in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic are levied costs of which
they pay 20 to 40 percent. Interestingly enough, the range of delivery of water is approximately
the same percentages, since the water systems in those areas are mostly non-functional (or was at
the end of the 20 th Century). Thus, water pricing at even cost recovery levels will not likely
succeed unless the system is operational.
As another example, in their chapter in Dinar's book, Diao and Roe report potential
impacts of agricultural reform (as likely with the just concluded free trade agreement) in
Morocco. Large losses are expected for farmers growing soft and hard wheat, particularly those
who irrigate. Since water is priced far below cost (and often not priced at all in the case of
groundwater), these losses appear as wealth and income losses to the farmers. A market for
water rights would permit those farmers to substantially reduce these losses by selling water
rights to growers of crops more profitable on the world market, such as citrus and vegetables.
How far has the Moroccan government advanced in the 10 years since the "new" water law was
passed allowing river basin water management agencies to provide appropriations of water and
charge for both surface and ground water? Very little distance indeed. There is almost no
discussion of water markets among water management agencies at the basin or national level,
and to date water charges remain much below costs. Moreover, agricultural interests were able
to negotiate a 15 to 20 year phasing-in period for agricultural reform in cereal grains. Clearly,
change comes slowly in agriculture and seemingly even more slowly in water.
The Moroccan example also illustrates a second problem in water pricing reform. It is
very difficult to develop support for the reduction in water subsidies to agriculture (or other
sectors, for that matter), when trading partners provide those same subsidies. Given that the U.S.
subsidizes water for irrigation of many cereals - rice and wheat, for example - the argument that
the Moroccan government should implement water pricing reform can not be very appealing.
Clearly, reducing water subsidies to Moroccan farmers will make them worse off - either
reducing their income or reducing their competitive position, or both. No wonder that water
pricing reform is a very slow process. Until developed nations begin to phase out water
subsidies to agriculture, it will be very hard to convince developing nations to do so.
Another example is that of Egypt. First, water pricing is not accepted by most
agricultural water users. Moreover, the system of delivery is such that water deliveries must be
on a rotational basis (with the possible exception of the Fayoum example above). Measurement
of water deliveries occurs at the secondary or tertiary canal level, and not at the farm level. A
single rotation to a tertiary canal may serve hundreds of farmers. Water is delivered from the
tertiary canals to local canals from which farmers pump or divert (although some farmers pump
directly from the tertiary canals as well). The only technically feasible solution is to charge for
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water delivery to water user associations based on the measurable delivery point. Thus, in order
to manage demand using economic tools, the water user association would have to assess each
farmer according to his or her water offtake. Clearly, monitoring that offtake is expensive, and it
is quite possible that these transactions costs exceed the value of the conserved water. Further,
the aggregation of land into larger farms poses social problems unless alternative employment
opportunities exist (a so-called "balanced development" approach). In fact, in Egypt policies are
in place to distribute population to the countryside (on 5 hectare plots) in order to reduce further
urban growth.
Another technical problem is evident with small landholders in many countries (Egypt
and Morocco, for example). Often, administrative processes for changing land titles are so
cumbersome that recorded titles are not clear. In other cases, such as Morocco, dividing land
into smaller and smaller parcels (generation by generation) is legally constrained by a minimum
size regulation, so what titles exist are not registered to the current owner. One of the suggested
benefits of increasing water prices is the inducement to employ modem water saving
technologies (drip and sprinkler irrigation, for example). Small landholders are unlikely to have
sufficient capital to participate in conversion, and, moreover, lending agencies are unlikely to
treat land without clear title as collateral. Aggregation of small farms is also constrained without
clear titles.
One of the primary issues in water management in Egypt is high-water using crops (such
as rice or sugar cane). If high water-using crops are grown on a substantial portion of the canal,
the number of rotations is increased. The volume of delivery to the tertiary canal, however, is
not adjusted incrementally by volume. Facing the difficult task of monitoring off-takes, many
have suggested placing a water surcharge on rice and sugar cane production (this has also been
suggested more broadly in the literature as an alternative when volumetric pricing is not
possible). These kinds of water demand management tools may be less than efficient
themselves. First, the water demand effect is binary - either the tax is enough to dissuade the
production of the crop or not. If the farmer decides to grow the crop, the amount of water use is
basically unregulated by price. Secondly, it is quite possible that the crop is high value (or high
profit) to the farmer, in which case either the tax is ineffective in controlling water use, or it can
result in non-optimal farmer decisions. Maximizing "crop per drop" as an objective is not
necessarily economically efficient. Maximizing net value per drop (as a residual claimant) may
be.
Dinar points out that the issue of compensation is critical to finding support for demand
management. Water subsidies which have arisen from low or no water price are captured in the
value of other fixed assets (usually land) in the form of lease-hold interest. Increasing water
prices reduces income and asset value of those fixed resources without compensation. The
reduction in welfare will galvanize affected water users to oppose the increases in tariffs. The
beauty of water rights markets is that compensation is automatic (and negotiated). As Dinar
notes, informing the public and developing a base of support for tariff increases is essential.
Before concluding, Table 2 presents the past and projected water demand for the Middle
Eastern countries, as developed by the ESCWA secretariat of the U.N. Domestic and industrial
demands increase substantially, as might be expected from a region with growing populations.
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However, the most striking numbers are the increases in agricultural demand. In a very water
short region, with increasing high value pressure on water supplies, EVERY SINGLE
COUNTRY projected a substantial increase in agricultural water use. Forecasts of increasing
future agricultural water use can be found for almost every country listed today as extremely
water short by the FAO (plus most other countries as well). These projections suggest to me that
advocates of water demand management have a very difficult task ahead.

Country

Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Qatar
Saudi
Arabia
Syria
UAB
Palestine
Yemen

1990
2025
Domestic Industrial Agriculture Domestic Industrial Agriculture
17
86
120
230
271
73
2,700
4,600
49,700
6,300
10.9
69,100
3,800
1,450
45,200
4,750
3,560
66,000
190
43
650
175
1,090
750
295
80
1,100
140
8
160
310
750
1,100
2,581
60
450
81
5
1,150
1,500
630
350
109
230
205
76
9
50

1,508
650
513
78
168

192
146
27
7
31

14,600
6,930
950
140
2,700

6,450
3,070
1,100
800
840

1,450
2,300
50
70
137

16,300
22,900
2,050
420
3,800

Table 2. Estimated water demand by country (millions of cubic meters) taken from United
Nations.

Conclusions

Unfortunately, the conclusions which I draw from the literature and from my own
observations are that, in spite of the benefits which result from economically managing water
demand, the likelihood of massive use of the tools in the near future is not high in most
countries. Water markets offer a first-best solution (assuming third party effects are controlled),
but require recognition by governments of some form of water right and the ability to measure
water exchanges reasonably accurately. Institutional changes such as the provision of water
rights and markets are slow to develop unless some external force is applied. Water pricing
reform is also problematic, in that losers are very likely to vigorously oppose it, particularly
when the prices applied are not transparent. Although economists and water managers must look
to water demand management as an allocation tool, given that water supply augmentation is
become more limited, we should not expect the implementation of demand management to be
easy or quick. Patient explanations, careful institutional change and development, and
cognizance of the income and wealth distribution impacts will be necessary.
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